The horizonal structure of visual experience

Mitchell, Jonathan 2024. The horizonal structure of visual experience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (2) , pp. 428-448. 10.1080/00048402.2023.2289114 Item availability restricted.

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Abstract

How is it that we can visually experience complete three-dimensional objects despite being limited, in any given perceptual moment, to perceiving the sides facing us from a specific spatial perspective? To make sense of this, such visual experiences must refer to occluded or presently unseen back-sides which are not sense-perceptually given, and which cannot be sense-perceptually given while the subject is occupying the spatial perspective on the object that they currently are—I call this the horizonality of visual experience. Existing accounts of these horizonal references are unsatisfactory. In providing a satisfactory account, this paper argues that the content and structure of the visual experience of complete three-dimensional objects is as follows: the object is presented as being perceptible from yet-to-be-determined alternative points of view. As part of the content of visual experience, this motivates non-propositional attitudes of anticipation. Explicating this proposal is the central positive aim of this paper.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Publisher:	Taylor and Francis Group
ISSN:	0004-8402
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	24 May 2023
Date of Acceptance:	20 July 2023
Last Modified:	08 Nov 2024 20:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/159918

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