The discretionary normativity of requests

Lewis, James H. P. 2018. The discretionary normativity of requests. Philosophers' Imprint 18 (20) , pp. 1-16.

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Abstract

Being able to ask others to do things, and thereby giving them reasons to do those things, is a prominent feature of our interpersonal lives. In this paper, I discuss the distinctive normative status of requests – what makes them different from commands and demands. I argue for a theory of this normative phenomenon which explains the sense in which the reasons presented in requests are a matter of discretion. This discretionary quality, I argue, is something that other theories cannot accommodate, though it is a significant aspect of the relations that people stand in to one another, and the kinds of practical reasons that flow from those relations.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Michigan Publishing
ISSN:	1533-628X
Funders:	White Rose College of the Arts and Humanities
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	4 October 2023
Date of Acceptance:	12 May 2018
Last Modified:	30 Nov 2024 02:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/162926

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