Mind the framing when studying social preferences in the domain of losses

Antinyan, Armenak ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9960-3618, Corazzini, Luca, Fišar, Miloš and Reggiani, Tommaso ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3134-1049 2024. Mind the framing when studying social preferences in the domain of losses. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 218 , pp. 599-612. 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.12.024

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Abstract

There is no consensus in whether monetary losses make individuals more generous or selfish. Utilizing a dictator game (DG), we study the impact of loss framing on altruism and find that dictators’ altruism is sensitive to the loss frame they are embedded in. In a DG in which the dictators share a loss between themselves and a recipient, the monetary allocations are more benevolent than in a setting without a loss and in a DG in which the dictators share what remains of their endowments after a loss. These differences are explained by the social norms the loss frames invoke.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Schools > Business (Including Economics)
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0167-2681
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	18 January 2024
Date of Acceptance:	18 December 2023
Last Modified:	18 Jun 2025 01:45
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/165468

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