Mind the framing when studying social preferences in the domain of losses

Antinyan, Armenak ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9960-3618, Corazzini, Luca, Fišar, Miloš and Reggiani, Tommaso ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3134-1049 2024. Mind the framing when studying social preferences in the domain of losses. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 218 , pp. 599-612. 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.12.024 Item availability restricted.

PDF - Accepted Post-Print Version Restricted to Repository staff only until 18 June 2025 due to copyright restrictions. Download (724kB)

Abstract

There is no consensus in whether monetary losses make individuals more generous or selfish. Utilizing a dictator game (DG), we study the impact of loss framing on altruism and find that dictators’ altruism is sensitive to the loss frame they are embedded in. In a DG in which the dictators share a loss between themselves and a recipient, the monetary allocations are more benevolent than in a setting without a loss and in a DG in which the dictators share what remains of their endowments after a loss. These differences are explained by the social norms the loss frames invoke.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0167-2681
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	18 January 2024
Date of Acceptance:	18 December 2023
Last Modified:	12 Nov 2024 02:00
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/165468

Citation Data

Cited 1 time in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item