Varieties of second-personal reason

Lewis, James H. P. 2024. Varieties of second-personal reason. Erkenntnis 10.1007/s10670-024-00798-4

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Abstract

A lineage of prominent philosophers who have discussed the second-person relation can be regarded as advancing structural accounts. They posit that the second-person relation effects one transformative change to the structure of practical reasoning. In this paper, I criticise this orthodoxy and offer an alternative, substantive account. That is, I argue that entering into second-personal relations with others does indeed affect one's practical reasoning, but it does this not by altering the structure of one's agential thought, but by changing what reasons can become available. The importance of second-personal thought for action is heterogenous. Second-person relations make possible the emergence of a wide variety of different kinds of practical reasons: creating some, reveal-ing others. Recognising this diminishes the appeal of the traditional, structural accounts of the practical significance of such second-personal relations. Moving away from struc-tural accounts facilitates a more thorough understanding of the intersubjective form of action.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	In Press
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0165-0106
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	20 March 2024
Date of Acceptance:	19 February 2024
Last Modified:	21 May 2024 12:36
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/167385

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