Disgust and its implications for naturalistic virtue ethics

Paskin, James 2024. Disgust and its implications for naturalistic virtue ethics. PhD Thesis, Cardiff University. Item availability restricted.

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Abstract

This thesis examines the implications an empirical account of disgust has for Naturalistic Virtue Ethics. It begins by characterising character trait-based Naturalistic, Transcendental, and Consequentialist Virtue Theories and then identifies Naturalistic Theories as the subject of this thesis because their dependence on the psychological reality of virtue makes them vulnerable to an incompatible account of the psychology of disgust. A review of the normative debate surrounding disgust’s place in morality then establishes disgust’s relationship with virtue, situating it as an aesthetic moral reaction to displays of vice. Using up-to-date empirical literature and evolutionary theory, the thesis then constructs the Dual Mechanism Theory, an original account of disgust which characterises it as possessing a physical mechanism — a reflex that facilitates poison and parasite aversion — and a social mechanism — an emotion that communicates negative character judgements to maintain in-group cohesion. Compatibility between the Dual Mechanism Theory and the Naturalistic Virtue Ethics is then examined, and the practical and metaethical problems of motivation interference by physical disgust are established. The practical problem is resolved through a commitment to a limited developmental account of virtue. However, attempts to resolve the metaethical problem produce further problems, so it is concluded that the metaethical problem is irresolvable for existing forms of Naturalistic Virtue Ethics. The thesis concludes by integrating Webber’s and Tanesini’s formulations of Attitude Virtue with McMullin’s phenomenological account of natural goodness and examining whether this reconceptualization of Naturalistic Virtue can solve this problem. It explains how Attitude Virtue can avoid the problems present in character trait-based theories and how McMullin’s theory of natural goodness facilitates a naturalistic justification of motivation interference. Therefore, this reformulation of Naturalistic Virtue effectively resolves the metaethical problem and so establishes its compatibility with disgust in light of the considerations raised in this thesis.

Item Type:	Thesis (PhD)
Date Type:	Completion
Status:	Unpublished
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	8 July 2024
Last Modified:	08 Jul 2024 10:48
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/170409

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