Rationalising Framing Effects: At Least One Task for Empirically Informed Philosophy

Fisher, Sarah 2020. Rationalising Framing Effects: At Least One Task for Empirically Informed Philosophy. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 52 (156) , pp. 5-30. 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1221

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Abstract

Human judgements are affected by the words in which information is presented —or ‘framed’. According to the standard gloss, ‘framing effects’ reveal counter-normative reasoning, unduly affected by positive/negative language. One challenge to this view suggests that number expressions in alternative framing conditions are interpreted as denoting lower-bounded (minimum) quantities. However, it is unclear whether the resulting explanation is a rationalising one. I argue that a number expression should only be interpreted lower-boundedly if this is what it actually means. I survey how number expressions might be assigned lower-bounded meanings, due to their conventional semantics or pragmatic enrichment in context. I argue that deciding between these possibilities requires foundational philosophical input.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
ISSN:	1870-4905
Last Modified:	18 Sep 2024 13:45
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/172180

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