Defining preferences over framed outcomes does not secure agents' rationality

Fisher, Sarah 2022. Defining preferences over framed outcomes does not secure agents' rationality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45 10.1017/S0140525X22001029

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Abstract

Bermúdez claims that agents think about framed outcomes, not outcomes themselves; and that seemingly incoherent preferences can be rational, once defined over framed outcomes. However, the agents in his examples know that alternative frames describe the same outcome, neutrally understood. This undermines the restriction of their preferences to framed outcomes and, in turn, the argument for rational framing effects.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
ISSN:	0140-525X
Last Modified:	23 Sep 2024 14:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/172182

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