Description invariance: a rational principle for human agents

Fisher, Sarah 2023. Description invariance: a rational principle for human agents. Economics and Philosophy 40 (1) , pp. 42-54. 10.1017/S0266267123000019

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Abstract

This article refines a foundational tenet of rational choice theory known as the principle of description invariance. Attempts to apply this principle to human agents with imperfect knowledge have paid insufficient attention to two aspects: first, agents’ epistemic situations, i.e. whether and when they recognize alternative descriptions of an object to be equivalent; and second, the individuation of objects of description, i.e. whether and when objects count as the same or different. An important consequence is that many apparent ‘framing effects’ may not violate the principle of description invariance, and the subjects of these effects may not be irrational.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press (CUP): HSS Journals
ISSN:	0266-2671
Last Modified:	23 Sep 2024 09:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/172186

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