Teaching & learning guide for: Risky‐choice framing and rational decision‐making

Fisher, Sarah A and Mandel, David R 2021. Teaching & learning guide for: Risky‐choice framing and rational decision‐making. Philosophy Compass 16 (8) , e12763. doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12794

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Abstract

An influential program of psychological research suggests that people's judgements and decisions depend on the way in which information is presented, or ‘framed’. In a central choice paradigm, decision-makers seem to adopt different preferences, and different attitudes to risk, depending on whether the options specify the number of people who will be saved or the corresponding number who will die. It is standardly assumed that such responses violate a foundational tenet of rational decision-making, known as the principle of description invariance. However, recent theoretical and empirical research has begun to challenge the dominant ‘irrationalist’ narrative. The alternative approaches being developed typically pay close attention to how decision-makers represent decision problems (including their interpretation of numerical quantifiers or predicate choice). They also highlight the need for a more robust characterization of the description invariance principle itself.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Wiley
ISSN:	1747-9991
Last Modified:	18 Sep 2024 11:45
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/172189

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