Disagreement and intellectual virtues and vices

Tanesini, Alessandra ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6250-471X 2024. Disagreement and intellectual virtues and vices. Baghramian, Maria, Carter, J. Adam and Cosker-Rowland, Rach, eds. The Routledge Handbook on the Philosophy of Disagreement, London: Routledge,

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Abstract

Disagreements about what is the case can be good because epistemically productive or destructive because they worsen the epistemic positions of the participants. This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of one factor that makes a difference between productive and destructive disagreements: the virtues and vices of the parties and witnesses to disagreements. The chapter offers a pluralist account of the virtues that promote good disagreements and vices that facilitate bad ones. It focuses on disagreements among individuals during debates and conversations and on internal disagreements within deliberative groups. It concludes with some brief remarks on some strategies for improving the epistemic quality of deliberations, discussions, and debates among those who disagree with each other.

Item Type:	Book Section
Status:	In Press
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Publisher:	Routledge
ISBN:	9780367723484
Last Modified:	08 Oct 2024 11:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/172315

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