Cusack, Alan and Dehaghani, Roxanna ![]() Item availability restricted. |
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Abstract
Pre-trial criminal processes can prove challenging for suspects with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities. In recognition of this, the European Court of Human Rights has emphasised the importance of individualised assessments of vulnerability under Article 6. Yet, recent Strasbourg jurisprudence reveals a juridical willingness to define vulnerability narrowly with significant implications. This article analyses this jurisprudence to excavate the framing of vulnerability vis-à-vis fair trial rights during pre-trial processes. Drawing upon a corpus of psychology and law literature, as well as the dissenting judgment in Hasáliková, it critiques the narrow formulation of vulnerability that has taken hold in Strasbourg, and interrogates the Court’s ostensible faith in the safeguarding capacity of lawyers. By using Ireland’s weak pre-trial procedural framework as heuristic lens through which the shortcomings of this approach can be understood, it calls for a more generous conceptualisation of vulnerability that is sensitive to the ontological and structural dimensions at play.
Item Type: | Article |
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Status: | In Press |
Schools: | Schools > Law |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
ISSN: | 1461-7781 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 5 March 2025 |
Date of Acceptance: | 23 February 2025 |
Last Modified: | 05 Mar 2025 12:45 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/176571 |
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