Why law may very well be computable: the case of the reasonable person

Siliquini-Cinelli, Luca 2025. Why law may very well be computable: the case of the reasonable person. Siliquini-Cinelli, Luca and Neoh, Joshua, eds. Research Handbook on Epistemologies of Law, Research Handbooks in Legal Theory, Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 402-419. (10.4337/9781035348008.00041)

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Abstract

A prominent topic in contemporary legal literature is whether law is or may be computable, that is, whether law's regulatory function can be exerted by computing devices. Merging philosophical reflection with insights from cognitive and computer science studies, this chapter argues that if the ‘computational theory of thought’ (‘CTT’) is right, then it follows that to the extent that law is a product of the intellect (i.e. of a thinking process), it is computable. To support this argument, the chapter shows that one of the key epistemic-ontological constructs in law – the reasonable person standard – operates analogously to how thoughts operate according to the CTT. This finding, the chapter concludes, suggests that law may indeed be computable.

Item Type:	Book Section
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Schools > Cardiff Law & Politics
Publisher:	Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN:	9781035347995
Last Modified:	16 Mar 2026 15:33
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/177732

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