Communicating in a coordination game with private information

Cabrales, Antonio, Drouvelis, Michalis, Gürgüç, Zeynep and Ray, Indrajit ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5254-3144 2025. Communicating in a coordination game with private information. Economic Theory 10.1007/s00199-025-01683-z Item availability restricted.

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Abstract

We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, preceded by a round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent payoffs from the game. We find that individuals are largely truthful (about 80% overall) in revealing their types in both one-way and two-way cheap talk. Furthermore, the unique symmetric cheap-talk equilibrium in the two-way cheap talk game is played when the players fully reveal their information. However, they attain even higher payoffs in the game with one-way talk by choosing the desired coordinated outcome following truthful announcements, which deviates from the theoretical equilibrium.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	In Press
Schools:	Schools > Business (Including Economics)
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0938-2259
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	17 September 2025
Date of Acceptance:	1 September 2025
Last Modified:	18 Sep 2025 14:45
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/181148

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