Tactical refereeing and signaling by publishing

Popov, Sergey V. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6899-9293 2025. Tactical refereeing and signaling by publishing. Kyklos 10.1111/kykl.70021

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Abstract

Peer review is usually conducted to allocate limited resources, such as the budget of a funder or the pages of a journal. Limited capacity may bias peer evaluations, precisely because approving a peer's worthy project consumes capacity, jeopardizing the referee's own project's chances. I show that limiting capacity is inconsistent with a hypothesis that the decision-maker desires to stimulate efforts. I show that the desire to strengthen the signaling message of the acceptance decision could lead to limiting the capacity, endogenously creating a tragedy of informational commons problem.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	In Press
Schools:	Schools > Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare Q Science > Q Science (General)
Publisher:	Wiley
ISSN:	0023-5962
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	24 September 2025
Date of Acceptance:	23 September 2025
Last Modified:	13 Oct 2025 09:00
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/181268

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