Tactical refereeing and signaling by publishing

Popov, Sergey ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6899-9293 2025. Tactical refereeing and signaling by publishing. Kyklos Item availability restricted.

PDF (File requires 24 month embargo from date of first publication.) - Accepted Post-Print Version Restricted to Repository staff only until 30 September 2027 due to copyright restrictions. Download (304kB)

Abstract

Peer review is usually conducted to allocate limited resources, such as the budget of a funder or the pages of a journal. Limited capacity may bias peer evaluations, precisely because approving a peer's worthy project consumes capacity, jeopardising the referee's own project's chances. I show that limiting capacity is inconsistent with a hypothesis that the decision-maker desires to stimulate efforts. I show that the desire to strengthen the signaling message of the acceptance decision could lead to limiting the capacity, endogenously creating a tragedy of informational commons problem.

Item Type:	Article
Status:	In Press
Schools:	Schools > Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare Q Science > Q Science (General)
ISSN:	0023-5962
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	24 September 2025
Date of Acceptance:	23 September 2025
Last Modified:	24 Sep 2025 12:15
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/181268

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item