On the effectiveness of the civil regime's penalty-setting framework against insider dealing in the UK

Mirrakhimov, Rustam 2024. On the effectiveness of the civil regime's penalty-setting framework against insider dealing in the UK. Journal of Economic Criminology 6 , 100095. 10.1016/j.jeconc.2024.100095

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Abstract

This paper carries out a first-of-its-kind evaluation of the effectiveness of insider dealing policy in the UK focusing on the civil regime's penalty-setting framework against individuals. Under the assumption that there is a risk of underestimating illegal benefits from insider dealing for the purposes of a penalty determination, and due to the ambiguous punitive nature of disgorgement, the paper puts forward a novel two-step algorithm for inferring a deterrent effect from a civil financial sanction. It is found that in around half of the included cases deterrence is undermined. Hence the implementation of the policy may have been ineffective.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Schools > Cardiff Law & Politics Schools > Law
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	2949-7914
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	29 September 2025
Date of Acceptance:	9 September 2024
Last Modified:	30 Sep 2025 13:45
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/181382

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