Gillman, Max 2009. International deposit insurance. Economic Affairs 29 (3) , pp. 103-104. 10.1111/j.1468-0270.2009.01932.x |
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2009.01932.x
Abstract
The current banking crisis has highlighted the fragility of the international finance system and the extent to which current system safeguards such as IMF action fall short. Envisioning a fuller banking security system leads naturally to the proposal for an international deposit insurance system based on risk-based premiums. This proposal is outlined here as a replacement for ad hoc action by national governments and the IMF that is designed to avoid moral hazard while providing an efficient means to international banking security as part of our global financial architecture.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | Business (Including Economics) |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HG Finance H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General) |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Deposit insurance ; Risk-based premiums ; IMF ; Capital requirements ; Governance |
Publisher: | Wiley-Blackwell |
ISSN: | 0265-0665 |
Last Modified: | 19 Mar 2016 22:30 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/18951 |
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