Goergen, Marc ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4391-2651 and Renneboog, Luc 2011. Managerial compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (4) , pp. 1068-1077. 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.06.002 |
Abstract
We review the existing literature on managerial compensation, with particular reference to the two contrasting views about its main driver. On the one hand, managerial compensation is seen to be the result of a market-based mechanism which ensures that managers have adequate incentives to maximize shareholder value. On the other hand, it is regarded to be a means whereby self-serving executives skim corporate profits and expropriate shareholders. We find that most of the existing literature supports the latter view as executives tend to benefit from windfall earnings and are able to extract rents in the presence of weak corporate governance.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | Business (Including Economics) |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management H Social Sciences > HF Commerce H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Managerial compensation ; Corporate governance ; Managerial incentives ; Principal-agent problem |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
ISSN: | 0929-1199 |
Last Modified: | 19 Oct 2022 08:53 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/19398 |
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