Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint.

Azacis, Helmuts ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6061-2100 2007. Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint. Games and Economic Behavior 62 (1) , pp. 140-154. 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.011

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Abstract

I consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment–price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium the set of true envy-free allocations.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Schools > Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Publisher:	John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
ISSN:	10902473
Last Modified:	17 Oct 2022 09:19
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/2727

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