A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies

Hahn, Ulrike and Oaksford, Michael 2006. A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies. Synthese 152 (2) , pp. 207-236. 10.1007/s11229-005-5233-2

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Abstract

We examine in detail three classic reasoning fallacies, that is, supposedly ``incorrect'' forms of argument. These are the so-called argumentam ad ignorantiam, the circular argument or petitio principii, and the slippery slope argument. In each case, the argument type is shown to match structurally arguments which are widely accepted. This suggests that it is not the form of the arguments as such that is problematic but rather something about the content of those examples with which they are typically justified. This leads to a Bayesian reanalysis of these classic argument forms and a reformulation of the conditions under which they do or do not constitute legitimate forms of argumentation.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Psychology
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0039-7857
Last Modified:	19 Dec 2017 04:07
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/33074

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