A Normative Theory of Argument Strength

Hahn, Ulrike and Oaksford, Michael 2006. A Normative Theory of Argument Strength. Informal Logic 26 (1) , pp. 1-24.

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Abstract

In this article, we argue for the general importance of normative theories of argument strength. We also provide some evidence based on our recent work on the fallacies as to why Bayesian probability might, in fact, be able to supply such an account. In the remainder of the article we discuss the general characteristics that make a specifically Bayesian approach desirable, and critically evaluate putative flaws of Bayesian probability that have been raised in the argumentation literature.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Psychology
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Argumentation, fallacies, Bayesian probability, argument from ignorance, slippery slope arguments, circular arguments, Theophrastus rule
Publisher:	University of Windsor
ISSN:	0824-2577
Last Modified:	19 Dec 2017 04:07
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/33085

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