The power PC theory and causal powers: reply to Cheng (1997) and Novick and Cheng (2004)

White, Peter Anthony ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9080-6678 2005. The power PC theory and causal powers: reply to Cheng (1997) and Novick and Cheng (2004). Psychological Review 112 (3) , pp. 675-682. 10.1037/0033-295X.112.3.675

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Abstract

Comments on the articles by Cheng and by Novick and Cheng. It has been claimed that the power PC theory reconciles regularity and power theories of causal judgment by showing how contingency information is used for inferences about unobservable causal powers. Under the causal powers theory causal relations are understood as generative relations in which a causal power of one thing acts on a liability of another thing under some releasing condition. These 3 causal roles are implicit or explicit in all causal interpretations. The power PC theory therefore fails to reconcile power theories and regularity theories because it has a fundamentally different definition of power and does not accommodate the tripartite causal role distinction. Implications of this distinction are drawn out.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Psychology
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Publisher:	American Psychological Association
ISSN:	0033-295X
Last Modified:	17 Oct 2022 09:31
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/3425

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