Explaining the diversity in shareholder lockup agreements

Goergen, Marc ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4391-2651, Renneboog, Luc and Khurshed, Arif 2006. Explaining the diversity in shareholder lockup agreements. Journal of Financial Intermediation 15 (2) , pp. 254-280. 10.1016/j.jfi.2005.10.001

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Abstract

This paper investigates whether shareholder lockup agreements in France and Germany mitigate problems of agency and asymmetric information. Despite minimum requirements in terms of the length and percentage of shares locked up, lockup agreements are not only highly diverse across firms but also across the different shareholders of a single firm as most firms have different agreements in place for executives, non-executives and venture capitalists. The diversity across firms and types of shareholders can be explained by firm characteristics—such as the level of uncertainty—as well as the type and importance of each shareholder within the firm.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Initial public offerings; Lockup agreements; Underpricing; Asymmetric information; Agency costs; Valuation
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	1042-9573
Last Modified:	08 Dec 2022 11:04
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/37597

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