Tye's representationalism: Feeling the heat?

Gray, Richard ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6923-6183 2003. Tye's representationalism: Feeling the heat? Philosophical Studies 115 (3) , pp. 245-256. 10.1023/A:1025129319705

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

According to Tye’s PANIC theory of consciousness, perceptualstates of creatures which are related to a disjunction ofexternal contents will fail to represent sensorily, andthereby fail to be conscious states. In this paper I argue that heat perception, a form of perception neglected in the recent literature, serves as a counterexample to Tye’s radical externalist claim. Having laid out Tye’s `absentqualia’ scenario, the PANIC theory from which it derives and the case of heat perception as a counterexample, I defend the putative counterexample against three possible responses: (1) that heat perception represents general(i.e. non-disjunctive) intrinsic properties of objects,(2) that heat perception represents the non-specific heat energy that is transferred between a subject’s body and another body and (3) that heat perception exclusively represents heat properties of the subject’s own body.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0031-8116
Last Modified:	06 Jan 2024 03:06
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/3783

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item