Axelrod Meets Cournot: Oligopoly and the Evolutionary Metaphor

Dixon, Huw David ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9875-8965, Wallis, Steven and Moss, Scott 2002. Axelrod Meets Cournot: Oligopoly and the Evolutionary Metaphor. Computational Economics 20 (3) , pp. 139-156. 10.1023/A:1020922214711

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

This paper explores the implication of evolutionary models (replicatordynamics) in a simple Cournot duopoly model. A firm type is a linear decisionrule in which the firm's output depends on the other firm's previous output.First we run an Axelrod Tournament between firm types. The champion firm isa near profit-maximizer. Secondly, we allow social evolution to occur usingreplicator dynamics. Here we find that there are very strong forces leadingtowards a collusive or near collusive outcome, so long as there is not toomuch `noise' in the dynamics.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HA Statistics H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HG Finance Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Evolution; Cournot; duopoly; Sectors; Finance, Business & Banking
Publisher:	Springer Verlag
ISSN:	0927-7099
Last Modified:	21 Oct 2022 10:00
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/38690

Citation Data

Cited 9 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item