Cardiff University | Prifysgol Caerdydd ORCA
Online Research @ Cardiff 
WelshClear Cookie - decide language by browser settings

Axelrod Meets Cournot: Oligopoly and the Evolutionary Metaphor

Dixon, Huw David, Wallis, Steven and Moss, Scott 2002. Axelrod Meets Cournot: Oligopoly and the Evolutionary Metaphor. Computational Economics 20 (3) , pp. 139-156. 10.1023/A:1020922214711

Full text not available from this repository.


This paper explores the implication of evolutionary models (replicatordynamics) in a simple Cournot duopoly model. A firm type is a linear decisionrule in which the firm's output depends on the other firm's previous output.First we run an Axelrod Tournament between firm types. The champion firm isa near profit-maximizer. Secondly, we allow social evolution to occur usingreplicator dynamics. Here we find that there are very strong forces leadingtowards a collusive or near collusive outcome, so long as there is not toomuch `noise' in the dynamics.

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Business (Including Economics)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
H Social Sciences > HA Statistics
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Uncontrolled Keywords: Evolution; Cournot; duopoly; Sectors; Finance, Business & Banking
Publisher: Springer Verlag
ISSN: 0927-7099
Last Modified: 04 Jun 2017 04:25

Citation Data

Cited 9 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item Edit Item