Sworn to grim necessity? Imperfections of European economic governance, normative political theory, and supreme emergency

Dyson, Kenneth Herbert Fewster ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6162-8729 2013. Sworn to grim necessity? Imperfections of European economic governance, normative political theory, and supreme emergency. Journal of European Integration 35 (3) , pp. 207-222. 10.1080/07036337.2013.774777

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

This contribution examines the Euro Area crisis and European economic governance reforms through a less technocratic lens. It argues for the need to reframe debate around foundation issues in normative legal and political theory. The defining issue is supreme emergency. The credibility of its capacity to act in supreme emergency is of existential significance for the Euro Area. At the same time this capacity poses is bound up with basic legitimacy issues. In particular, it involves ultimately contentious requirements for supranational executive discretion, including credible contingent commitments to take exceptional measures. Meeting these requirements exposed a power vacuum within the Euro Area, consequent on domestic political constraints. This vacuum was filled—if reluctantly—by the European Central Bank. However, difficult legitimacy issues remain. They leave open the credibility of the ECB contingent commitment to act in supreme emergency.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Department of Politics and International Relations (POLIR)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions J Political Science > JC Political theory J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Euro area crisis, European economic governance, European Central Bank, supreme emergency, normative political theory.
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis
Last Modified:	24 Oct 2022 10:54
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/46328

Citation Data

Cited 23 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item