Noisy contagion without mutation

Lee, I. H. and Valentinyi, Akos ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9166-7489 2000. Noisy contagion without mutation. Review of Economic Studies 67 (1) , pp. 47-56. 10.1111/1467-937X.00120

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Abstract

In a local interaction game agents play an identical stage game against their neighbours over time. For nearest neighbour interaction, it is established that, starting from a random initial configuration in which each agent has a positive probability of playing the risk dominant strategy, a sufficiently large population coordinates in the long-run on the risk dominant equilibrium almost surely. Our result improves on Blume (1995), Ellison (2000), and Morris (2000) by showing that the risk dominant equilibrium spreads to the entire population in a two dimensional lattice and without the help of mutation, as long as there is some randomness in the initial configuration.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
ISSN:	0034-6527
Last Modified:	24 Oct 2022 11:27
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/48173

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