Anglo-American relations 1950-51: three strikes for British prestige

Marsh, Steve ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3411-6488 2012. Anglo-American relations 1950-51: three strikes for British prestige. Diplomacy and Statecraft 23 (2) , pp. 304-330. 10.1080/09592296.2012.679484

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Abstract

In 1949–1950, Britain rejected ideas of being a third force between the post-war Superpowers and adopted instead an approach that has been the keystone of British foreign policy from that point onwards: “hugging America close.” The aspiration was to establish a position closely related to the United States yet sufficiently independent, effectively to harness American power to British ends. This now familiar position has been much-debated recently in the context of post-9/11 military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan especially. However, this analysis examines three crises immediately following the British decision in 1949–1950 to give priority to the Anglo–American “special relationship” to demonstrate that, for Britain, this policy from the onset was both advantageous and potentially difficult. The outcomes of crises over NATO's Atlantic Command, Iranian oil, and ANZUS demonstrate how expansion of United States influence benefitted Britain but sometimes also required painful British adjustment and loss of prestige.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Department of Politics and International Relations (POLIR)
Subjects:	J Political Science > JA Political science (General) J Political Science > JK Political institutions (United States) J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) > JN101 Great Britain J Political Science > JZ International relations
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis
ISSN:	0959-2296
Last Modified:	25 Oct 2022 07:58
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/50986

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