Shackel, Nicholas ![]() |
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Abstract
A prevalent assumption is that normativity is a unity. In this paper I argue against this assumption by demonstrating the problems it poses to a well known answer to a well known problem for taking rationality to be normative. John Broome's normative requirement relation does indeed avoid that problem, but insofar as the relation is supposed to offer a general characterisation of the normativity of rationality, it fails. It fails because it cannot capture an important aspect of the normativity of rationality, that it is available to guide us. I show that if we distinguish two kinds of normativity it need not fail in this way.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Additional Information: | Pdf uploaded in accordance with publisher's policy at http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0003-2638/ (accessed 03/07/14). |
Publisher: | Wiley-Blackwell |
ISSN: | 0003-2638 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 30 March 2016 |
Last Modified: | 22 May 2023 17:32 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/61295 |
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