Endogenous timing in trade policy games: Should governments use countervailing duties?

Collie, David Robert ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3132-648X 1994. Endogenous timing in trade policy games: Should governments use countervailing duties? Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 130 (1) , pp. 191-209. 10.1007/BF02706016

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Abstract

Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties? - Trade policy under oligopoly is analysed in two multistage games with endogenous timing of trade policy. At the beginning of the games, the domestic and foreign governments choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or two. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of both games, the domestic government will set its tariff (and production subsidy) at stage one and the foreign government its export subsidy at stage two. The domestic country commits not to use a countervailing duty in both games, and both countries are better off than when they set trade policy simultaneously.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0043--2636
Last Modified:	27 Oct 2022 08:36
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/62828

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