Collie, David Robert ![]() |
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(91)90041-4
Abstract
This paper analyses how retaliation affects the profit-shifting argument for export subsidies. At the first stage the foreign country sets its export subsidy and then at the second stage the domestic country sets its tariff and/or production subsidy. It is shown that if the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy, then it will always gain from a foreign export subsidy. When the domestic country uses a tariff and a production subsidy, the optimal foreign policy is an export subsidy, but if the domestic country only uses a tariff, then an export tax is usually the optimal policy.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | Business (Including Economics) |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
ISSN: | 0022-1996 |
Last Modified: | 27 Oct 2022 08:36 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/62830 |
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