Richard Rorty’s anti-representationalism: a critical study

Taylor, George Benedict 2014. Richard Rorty’s anti-representationalism: a critical study. PhD Thesis, Cardiff University. Item availability restricted.

	PDF - Supplemental Material Restricted to Repository staff only Download (108kB)
Preview	PDF - Accepted Post-Print Version Download (1MB) | Preview

Abstract

In this study I argue that Richard Rorty’s anti-representationalist philosophy arises from a misguided belief that realists are compelled to argue that we need a single and exclusive “mirror-like” form of representation to capture reality. I argue that Rorty fails to appreciate the fact that realists do not have to absolutely identify reality with a particular mirror-like representation of it and nor do they have to fall prey to an invidious distinction between reality and the various ways that we do represent it. I argue that we need not associate realism with the kind of absolutism that Rorty associates it with. To illustrate this I challenge Rorty’s attempt to claim that Nietzsche also rejects realism and interpret Nietzsche’s perspectivism as a form of realism. I also challenge Rorty’s anti-representationalism in the context of his political philosophy. In order to do this I assess the role that Rorty assigns to the poet in his liberal utopia by examining the work of Sylvia Plath and Tony Harrison. I also discuss the various positions that Hilary Putnam has adopted in order to explore different possibilities within realism and representationalism. I conclude that Putnam’s internal realism concedes too much to Rorty and that his earlier external realism is a better alternative.

Item Type:	Thesis (PhD)
Status:	Unpublished
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	10 January 2024
Last Modified:	10 Jan 2024 10:53
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/71408

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item