Liar!

Webber, Jonathan ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0529-5349 2013. Liar! Analysis 73 (4) , pp. 651-659. 10.1093/analys/ant081

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Abstract

We have good reason to condemn lying more strongly than misleading and to condemn bullshit assertion less harshly than lying but more harshly than misleading. We each have good reason to mislead rather than make bullshit assertions, but to make bullshit assertions rather than lie. This is because these forms of deception damage credibility in different ways. We can trust the misleader to assert only what they believe to be true. We can trust the bullshitter not to assert what they believe to be false. We cannot trust the liar at all.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	ethics, lying, misleading, bullshit, deception, speech, assertion, implicature
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
ISSN:	0003-2638
Date of Acceptance:	16 June 2013
Last Modified:	07 Nov 2023 01:50
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/77059

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