Webber, Jonathan ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0529-5349 2013. Liar! Analysis 73 (4) , pp. 651-659. 10.1093/analys/ant081 |
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Official URL: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/73/4/65...
Abstract
We have good reason to condemn lying more strongly than misleading and to condemn bullshit assertion less harshly than lying but more harshly than misleading. We each have good reason to mislead rather than make bullshit assertions, but to make bullshit assertions rather than lie. This is because these forms of deception damage credibility in different ways. We can trust the misleader to assert only what they believe to be true. We can trust the bullshitter not to assert what they believe to be false. We cannot trust the liar at all.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | ethics, lying, misleading, bullshit, deception, speech, assertion, implicature |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
ISSN: | 0003-2638 |
Date of Acceptance: | 16 June 2013 |
Last Modified: | 29 Nov 2024 08:30 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/77059 |
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