Bank efficiency in China, rent seeking versus X-inefficiency: a non-parametric bootstrapping approach

Matthews, Kent ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6968-3098, Guo, Jianguang, Zhang, Nina and Wang, Lina 2007. Bank efficiency in China, rent seeking versus X-inefficiency: a non-parametric bootstrapping approach. [Working Paper]. Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff: Cardiff University.

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Abstract

This study demarcates cost-inefficiency in Chinese banks into X-inefficiency and rent-seeking-inefficiency. A protected banking market not only encourages weak management and X-inefficiency but also public ownership and state directed lending encourages moral hazard and bureaucratic rent seeking. This paper uses bootstrap non-parametric techniques to estimate measures of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency for the 4 state owned banks and 11 joint-stock banks over the period 1997-2004. In contrast to other studies of the Chinese banking sector, the paper argues that reduced inefficiency is an indicator that the competitive threat of the opening up of the banking market in 2007 has produced tangible benefits in improved performance. This paper finds evidence of declining trend in both types of inefficiency.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Schools > Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	Cardiff University
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	30 March 2016
Last Modified:	28 Oct 2022 10:18
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/77753

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