Matthews, Kent ![]() |
Preview |
PDF
- Published Version
Download (321kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This study demarcates cost-inefficiency in Chinese banks into X-inefficiency and rent-seeking-inefficiency. A protected banking market not only encourages weak management and X-inefficiency but also public ownership and state directed lending encourages moral hazard and bureaucratic rent seeking. This paper uses bootstrap non-parametric techniques to estimate measures of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency for the 4 state owned banks and 10 joint-stock banks over the period 1997-2006. The paper adjusts for the quality of loans by treating NPLs as a negative output. The paper shows that Chinese banks have reduced cost inefficiency and reduced X-inefficiency at a faster rate than rent-seeking inefficiency.
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
---|---|
Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | Business (Including Economics) |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Publisher: | Cardiff University |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 30 March 2016 |
Last Modified: | 28 Oct 2022 10:18 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/77807 |
Actions (repository staff only)
![]() |
Edit Item |