Controlling banker’s bonuses: Efficient regulation or politics of envy?

Matthews, Kent ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6968-3098 and Mattehws, Owen 2009. Controlling banker’s bonuses: Efficient regulation or politics of envy? [Working Paper]. Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff: Cardiff University.

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Abstract

The positive relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk taking is a well established empirical fact. The global banking crisis has resulted in a chorus of demands to control banker’s bonuses and thereby curtail their risk taking activities in the hope that the world can avoid a repeat in the future. However, the positive relationship is not a causative one. In this paper we argue that the cushioning of banks downside risks provide the incentive for banks to take excessive risk and design compensation packages to deliver high returns. Macro-prudential regulation will have a better chance of curbing excess risk taking than controlling banker’s compensation.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	Cardiff University
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	30 March 2016
Last Modified:	28 Oct 2022 10:19
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/77845

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