Arrow's paradox and markets for nonproprietary information

Leppälä, Samuli 2013. Arrow's paradox and markets for nonproprietary information. [Working Paper]. Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff: Cardiff University.

Preview

PDF - Published Version Download (1MB) | Preview

Abstract

Arrow’s information paradox asserts that demand for undisclosed information is undefined. Reassessing the paradox, I argue that the value of information for the buyer depends on its relevance, which can be known ex ante, and the uncertainty shifts to the capability of the seller to acquire the knowledge and her reliability in disclosing it. These three together form the buyer’s reservation price. Consequently, differences in capability and reliability between the sellers may revoke the appropriation problem of non-proprietary information, where the original source loses her monopoly after the first purchase.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Schools > Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	Cardiff University
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	30 March 2016
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2015 15:23
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/77948

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item