The same-origin attack against location privacy

Theodorakopoulos, Georgios ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2701-7809 2015. The same-origin attack against location privacy. Presented at: 22nd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Denver, Colorado, USA, 12-126 October 2015. Published in: Ray, Indrajit, Hopper, Nicholas and Jansen, Rob eds. WPES '15 Proceedings of the 14th ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM, pp. 49-53. 10.1145/2808138.2808150

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Abstract

A plethora of applications benefit from location context, but a person's whereabouts can be linked to her personal sensitive information. Hence, protection mechanisms have been proposed that add systematic noise to a user's location before sending it out of the user's device. We describe the same-origin attack, to which a group of such mechanisms are vulnerable, we evaluate it against two mechanisms (spatial cloaking and geo-indistinguishability), and we propose our own mechanism, inspired by the maximum entropy principle. We find that spatial cloaking is much worse than the other two, and the maximum-entropy mechanism performs slightly better than geo-indistinguishability. Designing an optimal mechanism remains an open problem.

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Computer Science & Informatics
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Publisher:	ACM
Date of Acceptance:	25 July 2015
Last Modified:	01 Nov 2022 09:19
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/87555

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