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The same-origin attack against location privacy

Theodorakopoulos, Georgios ORCID: 2015. The same-origin attack against location privacy. Presented at: 22nd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Denver, Colorado, USA, 12-126 October 2015. Published in: Ray, Indrajit, Hopper, Nicholas and Jansen, Rob eds. WPES '15 Proceedings of the 14th ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM, pp. 49-53. 10.1145/2808138.2808150

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A plethora of applications benefit from location context, but a person's whereabouts can be linked to her personal sensitive information. Hence, protection mechanisms have been proposed that add systematic noise to a user's location before sending it out of the user's device. We describe the same-origin attack, to which a group of such mechanisms are vulnerable, we evaluate it against two mechanisms (spatial cloaking and geo-indistinguishability), and we propose our own mechanism, inspired by the maximum entropy principle. We find that spatial cloaking is much worse than the other two, and the maximum-entropy mechanism performs slightly better than geo-indistinguishability. Designing an optimal mechanism remains an open problem.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Computer Science & Informatics
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Publisher: ACM
Date of Acceptance: 25 July 2015
Last Modified: 01 Nov 2022 09:19

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