Rescuing Nietzsche from constitutivism

Robertson, Simon ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8340-1317 2017. Rescuing Nietzsche from constitutivism. Journal of Philosophical Research 42 , pp. 353-377. 10.5840/jpr201739100

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Abstract

Constitutivist theories in ethics seek to derive and justify normative ethical claims via facts about constitutive features of agency. In Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism, Paul Katsafanas uses Nietzsche to elucidate a version of the position he believes avoids worries besetting its competitors. This paper argues that Nietzschean constitutivism falters in many of the same places: it may remain vulnerable to ‘schmagency’ objections; it faces problems giving an account of the weights of reasons that adequately explains why we have more reason to perform some actions than others; and it is unable to generate normativity from constitutive aims. These doubts have wider import than Nietzschean constitutivism alone, though: they give good reason to think that such difficulties arise from the very structure of constitutivist approaches.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) P Language and Literature > PE English
Publisher:	Philosophy Documentation Center
ISSN:	1053-8364
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	21 December 2016
Date of Acceptance:	22 November 2016
Last Modified:	03 Dec 2024 05:00
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/97006

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