Timely shirking: time-dependent monitoring and its effects on legislative behavior in the U.S. Senate

Lindstadt, Rene ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7349-465X and Vander Wielen, R. J. 2011. Timely shirking: time-dependent monitoring and its effects on legislative behavior in the U.S. Senate. Public Choice 148 (1) , pp. 119-148. 10.1007/s11127-010-9649-y

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Abstract

We examine legislative shirking under conditions of imperfect constituent monitoring. Our core argument states that variation in information costs and constituent memory leads to systematic variation in constituent monitoring over time. Assuming that legislators are responsive to multiple cues, we expect to observe time-dependent legislative shirking. We develop a theoretical model of legislative behavior with time-dependent monitoring, which we test empirically using Senate roll call data. Our findings show that a substantial number of senators engage in systematic, time-dependent shirking, and that senators consistently move toward extreme positions when monitoring is low and toward moderate positions when it is high.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Department of Politics and International Relations (POLIR)
Subjects:	J Political Science > J General legislative and executive papers J Political Science > JK Political institutions (United States)
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Legislative politics; Legislative institutions; Elections; U.S. Congress; U.S. Senate; Shirking
Publisher:	Springer Verlag
ISSN:	0048-5829
Date of Acceptance:	16 April 2010
Last Modified:	02 Nov 2022 10:17
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/98133

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