A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels

Goncalves, Ricardo and Ray, Indrajit ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5254-3144 2017. A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels. Economics Letters 159 , pp. 177-179. 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.032

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Abstract

It is well-known that in the wallet game with two bidders, bidding twice the (individual) signal is an equilibrium. We prove that this strategy is never an equilibrium in a Japanese-English auction once discrete bid levels are introduced; we also discuss the implications of this result.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Schools > Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0165-1765
Funders:	British Academy
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	11 August 2017
Date of Acceptance:	28 July 2017
Last Modified:	04 May 2023 05:24
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/103343

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