The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion. Philosophical Studies 178 , pp. 2635-2663. 10.1007/s11098-020-01567-z

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Abstract

This paper provides an assessment of the bodily-attitudinal theory of emotions, according to which emotions are felt bodily attitudes of action readiness. After providing a reconstruction of the view and clarifying its central commitments two objections are considered (absence of bodily phenomenology and what kind of bodily awareness). An alternative object side interpretation of felt action readiness is then provided, which undermines the motivation for the bodily-attitudinal theory and creates problems for its claims concerning the content of emotional experience. The conclusion is that while the bodily-attitudinal theory marks out a distinctive proposal concerning the question of what emotions are, there remain significant issues which need addressing if it is to be a plausible competitor to existing theories of emotion.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Additional Information:	This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made.
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0031-8116
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	28 September 2021
Date of Acceptance:	30 September 2020
Last Modified:	17 Jun 2023 05:53
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/144435

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