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All-pay vs. standard auctions when competing for budget-constrained buyers

Selcuk, Cemil ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2267-604X 2024. All-pay vs. standard auctions when competing for budget-constrained buyers. Economics Letters 242 , 111886. 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111886

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Abstract

In a competitive market with budget-constrained buyers, an equilibrium where sellers compete with standard auctions fails to exist if the all-pay format is available. If budgets are not too limited, then all-pay auctions emerge as the preferred selling format.

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Business (Including Economics)
Publisher: Elsevier
ISSN: 0165-1765
Date of First Compliant Deposit: 18 July 2024
Date of Acceptance: 15 July 2024
Last Modified: 24 Jul 2024 15:44
URI: https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/170674

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