Passmore, Kevin ![]() ![]() |
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/09683445251329056
Abstract
Historians’ preoccupation with explaining why France lost the Battle of France in May and June 1940 obscures worthwhile histories that are not relevant to the outcome. Generalisation from the battle on the Meuse, where elite German units faced poor French forces, exaggerates the superiority of German troops’ mission-oriented tactics relative to the top-down ‘methodical’ tactics of the French. This article shows that French infantry tactics were the object of permanent politicised controversy, and that in the course of patrolling and skirmishing in the no-man’s-land between French and German fortifications, the French substantially modified their tactics and organisation.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Published Online |
Status: | In Press |
Schools: | Schools > History, Archaeology and Religion |
Publisher: | SAGE Publications |
ISSN: | 1477-0385 |
Funders: | Leverhulme Trust, British Academy |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 13 March 2025 |
Date of Acceptance: | 6 March 2025 |
Last Modified: | 27 Mar 2025 10:00 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/176687 |
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