Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

Azacis, Helmuts ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6061-2100 2005. Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint. [Working Paper]. Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff: Cardiff University. Available at: http://business.cardiff.ac.uk/sites/default/files/...

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Abstract

I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy- free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium the set of true envy-free allocations.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Indivisible Goods; Envy-Freeness; Implementation; Strong Nash Equilibrium
Publisher:	Cardiff University
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	30 March 2016
Last Modified:	24 Oct 2022 10:15
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/43596

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