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Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

Azacis, Helmuts ORCID: 2005. Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint. [Working Paper]. Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff: Cardiff University. Available at:

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I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy- free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium the set of true envy-free allocations.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Business (Including Economics)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Uncontrolled Keywords: Indivisible Goods; Envy-Freeness; Implementation; Strong Nash Equilibrium
Publisher: Cardiff University
Date of First Compliant Deposit: 30 March 2016
Last Modified: 24 Oct 2022 10:15

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