Primary auction of slots at European airports

Pertuiset, Thomas and Santos, Georgina ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8446-8297 2014. Primary auction of slots at European airports. Research in Transportation Economics 45 , pp. 66-71. 10.1016/j.retrec.2014.07.009

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Abstract

We use the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction mechanism to propose a system of primary auctions of slots at congested European airports. The system would ensure allocative efficiency and would be incentive-compatible, flexible, understandable, implementable and transparent. Only 10% of slots would be auctioned per year. The current slot coordination mechanism used in Europe, based on historic use of slots, would thus be phased out and disappear within a decade.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Schools > Geography and Planning (GEOPL)
Additional Information:	Released with a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives License (CC BY-NC-ND) Pdf uploaded in accordance with publisher's policies at http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0739-8859/ (accessed 17.12.14).
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0739-8859
Funders:	ESRC
Related URLs:	http://authors.elsevier.com/a/1Pkjn2eEmT...
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	30 March 2016
Last Modified:	28 Nov 2024 06:15
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/65455

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