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Primary auction of slots at European airports

Pertuiset, Thomas and Santos, Georgina ORCID: 2014. Primary auction of slots at European airports. Research in Transportation Economics 45 , pp. 66-71. 10.1016/j.retrec.2014.07.009

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We use the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction mechanism to propose a system of primary auctions of slots at congested European airports. The system would ensure allocative efficiency and would be incentive-compatible, flexible, understandable, implementable and transparent. Only 10% of slots would be auctioned per year. The current slot coordination mechanism used in Europe, based on historic use of slots, would thus be phased out and disappear within a decade.

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Geography and Planning (GEOPL)
Additional Information: Released with a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives License (CC BY-NC-ND) Pdf uploaded in accordance with publisher's policies at (accessed 17.12.14).
Publisher: Elsevier
ISSN: 0739-8859
Funders: ESRC
Related URLs:
Date of First Compliant Deposit: 30 March 2016
Last Modified: 28 Oct 2022 02:58

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